The authors report the case of a woman with a right basal ganglia lesion and severe mental-rotation impairments. She had no difficulty recognizing rotated objects and had intact left-right orientation in egocentric space but was unable to map the left and right sides of external objects to her egocentric reference frame. This study indicates that the right basal ganglia may be critical components in a cortico-subcortical network involved in mental rotation. We speculate that the role of these structures is to select and maintain an appropriate motor program for performing smooth and accurate rotation. The results also have important implications for theories of object recognition by demonstrating that recognition of rotated objects can be achieved without mental rotation.
The phenomenon of mental rotation has been extensively studied in cognitive psychology and, more recently, in cognitive neuroscience. Of greatest interest is the demonstration that when subjects are required to distinguish between identical and mirror-image shapes that are presented in different orientations, the reaction time (RT) varies as a function of the angular disparity of the stimuli (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Metzler, 1971 ). This time signature of the mental-rotation process closely resembles the time course of a physical rotation with constant angular velocity, which suggests that subjects imagine the rotated object passing through intermediate orientations using the same kinematic constraints that apply to physical objects (Shepard, 1984) . Evidence from patients with brain lesions and from functional imaging experiments indicates that the parietal lobes play an important role in mental rotation (Alivisatos & Petrides, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Ditunno & Mann, 1990; Harris et al., 2000; Kosslyn, Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Mehta & Newcombe, 1991; Passini, Rainville, & Habib, 2000; Pegna et al., 1997; Ratcliff, 1979; Richter, Ugurbil, Georgopoulos, & Kim, 1997; Tagaris et al., 1997; Zacks, Rypma, Gabrieli, Tversky, & Glover, 1999) . Although the relative contribution of the left and right hemispheres to mental rotation has been debated, recent carefully controlled studies confirm a predominant role for the right parietal lobe (Harris et al., 2000; Pegna et al., 1997) , consistent with the preferential involvement of the right hemisphere in visuospatial processing.
Traditionally, mental rotation has been studied within the framework of visuospatial skills and disorders. However, a number of findings indicate that this is also a strategic process that shares some characteristics with voluntary actions. For example, mental rotation does not occur automatically when people look at a rotated display, but rather it can be started and stopped at will, and its speed can also be controlled to some extent (Shepard & Cooper, 1982) . In addition, anecdotal evidence gathered from subjects during mental-rotation tasks reveals that people often attempt to "move" the objects, or report "kinesthetic imagery" of their hands rotating the objects (Kosslyn, 1994) . Taken together, these findings raise the possibility that brain systems involved in motor planning and execution might play an important role in mental rotation.
Recent studies support this contention. For example, when subjects carry out concurrent mental and motor rotations in the same direction, they are faster and make fewer errors than when the directions of the two rotations are incompatible (Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998; Wohlschlager & Wohlschlager, 1998) . Moreover, the actual speed of motor rotation, as well as its direction, can influence the speed of mental rotation (Wexler et al., 1998) . A number of brain imaging studies have identified activations in the primary motor and premotor cortex during mental rotation (Cohen et al., 1996; Kosslyn et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1995; Tagaris et al., 1997; Zacks et al., 1999) , and a recent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study demonstrated that TMS of primary motor cortex significantly slows down mental rotation, thus providing the first conclusive evidence for a critical role of motor systems in mental rotation (Ganis, Keenan, Kosslyn, & Pascual-Leone, 2000) . It has also been demonstrated that the primary motor cortex of monkeys is involved in at least some forms of mental rotation (Georgopoulos, Lurito, Petrides, Schwartz, & Massey, 1989; Georgopoulos & Pellizzer, 1995) . Some of these studies involved mental rotation of pictures of hands or other body parts, and it has been argued that this type of mental rotation may preferentially recruit the motor systems, whereas more object-based forms of mental rotation may not . However, there is good evidence from a number of recent experiments that motor processes play a role in the mental rotation of abstract figures as well (Jordan, Heinze, Lutz, Kanowski, & Jancke, 2001; Richter et al., 2000; Vingerhoets et al., 2001; Wexler et al., 1998) .
Although most of the studies reviewed above have focused on the motor cortex itself, there is some suggestion in the literature that subcortical components of the motor system, such as the basal ganglia, may also be implicated in mental rotation. Activation of the right caudate nucleus was found in one imaging study of mental rotation (Alivisatos & Petrides, 1997) . Mental-rotation impairments have been reported in some patients with Parkinson's disease (Lee, Harris, & Calvert, 1998 ; but see Boller et al., 1984; Brown & Marsden, 1986; Duncombe, Bradshaw, Iansek, & Phillips, 1994) . Furthermore, deficits in mentally performing spatial manipulations have also been demonstrated in patients with Huntington's disease (Mohr et al., 1991) , in which degeneration of the caudate nucleus is the primary pathology.
In this article, we describe a patient with a right basal ganglia lesion (affecting the caudate nucleus, the putamen, and the globus pallidus) who demonstrates severe impairments on mental-rotation tasks. To our knowledge, this is the first documented case of mental-rotation deficits following a unilateral, right-sided lesion of the corpus striatum, and it suggests that this region is a critical component in a cortico-subcortical network involved in mental transformations of visual images.
Case Report C.B., a 78-year-old, right-handed woman, presented to hospital on May 19, 1999 with left-sided weakness, left facial droop, and slurred speech, and was diagnosed with a right hemisphere stroke. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) performed 2 weeks after admission demonstrated hemorrhagic infarcts in the right caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, and putamen, consistent with occlusion of the M1 segment of the right middle cerebral artery (see Figure 1) . The remaining territory of the right middle cerebral artery, in particular its cortical distribution, was largely spared. The initial MRI had also revealed a small infarction in the right temporal pole, but this had resolved by the time a follow-up computerized tomography (CT) scan was performed 3 weeks later (i.e., 5 weeks after the stroke). The CT scan showed a persisting area of infarction in the distribution of the right body and tail of the caudate nucleus, with some slight associated ex vacuo dilatation of the lateral ventricle. Importantly for this study, there was no evidence of parietal or frontal lobe cortical lesions, although we cannot rule out the possibility of further neuronal loss or diaschistic effects that could not be visualised on the MRI and CT scans. C.B. underwent rehabilitation, and her motor signs had largely resolved by the time she was discharged 1 month later.
At the time of her stroke, C.B. was retired from her job as an industrial chemist in a leading research center, but she was still a very active and independent woman. She was on the board of her local council, was involved in a number of community organizations, and regularly played bridge. Following her stroke, C.B. demonstrated marked cognitive changes associated with some lack of insight into her problems. An initial neuropsychological examination in June 1999 revealed well-preserved verbal reasoning skills but significant difficulties in the areas of learning, working memory, and visuospatial skills (see Table 1 ). She exhibited some neglect on drawing and constructional tasks. A follow-up assessment in November 1999 revealed improvements in attention and memory function, particularly in the verbal domain, although she continued to perform below her estimated high average premorbid level of functioning on tests of visual processing and visual memory (see Table 1 ). Some of these findings, such as the constructional apraxia and the neglect, would suggest more widespread right hemisphere dysfunction than indicated by the visible lesion, perhaps implicating the right parietal lobe. However, C.B.'s poor performance on constructional tests could be explained equally well as motor sequencing problems arising from basal ganglia damage. Similarly, neglect is known to arise from damage to various parts of the brain, including the inferior parietal lobe, the frontal lobe, and subcortical structures such as the thalamus and basal ganglia (Vallar, 1993) . Thus, the presence of these two features is not a strong argument for cortical damage. In an attempt to clarify this, we carried out more detailed investigations of C.B.'s visual and spatial processing.
Visual and Spatial Processing
More detailed investigations of C.B.'s visual processing were undertaken in December 1999, 7 months after her stroke. Her object naming (e.g., Boston Naming Test) was normal, and she was able to identify 38 out of 40 line drawings (38/40) of objects taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus, even when they were rotated by 90°or 180°in the picture plane. Moreover, she performed equally well with similarly rotated silhouettes of these objects (19/20) . In contrast, recognition of depth-rotated silhouettes from the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (VOSP; Warrington & James, 1991) was below normal levels (see Table 2 ), and she showed a very mild impairment in matching objects photographed from prototypical and unusual views (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1984) . Finally, her recognition of fragmented drawings (Hooper Visual Organization Test) and letters (VOSP) was extremely poor. Together, these results indicate generally well-preserved recognition of objects but suggest a difficulty in mentally manipulating fragmented visual images and recognizing degraded viewpoints of objects that obscure salient features.
Basic spatial skills, as assessed with the VOSP, were relatively intact (see Table 2 ). Her left-right orientation in Note. First assessment was June 15, 1999. Second assessment was November 1, 1999. Age-scaled scores (M ϭ 10, SD ϭ 3) are based on the Mayo Older Americans Normative Studies (Ivnik, Malec, Smith, Tangalos, & Petersen, 1992a , 1992b , 1992c personal space was assessed with a questionnaire that includes fairly complex questions, such as asking the subject to touch her left ear with her right hand (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983) , and was, likewise, found to be very good. She had no difficulty discriminating an upright from an upside-down shape, making no errors when the stimuli were letters and only one error when the stimuli were line drawings of objects. Her ability to determine the canonical upright orientation of objects was also intact (for a description of the task, see Harris, Harris, & Caine, 2001 ). She performed well (19/21 correct) on a test of visual imagery aimed specifically at her knowledge of the spatial organization of object parts. This test contained questions such as "Is a bottle narrower at the top, the bottom or on one side?" or "Does a question mark have a dot at the top, bottom or to one side?" These tests suggest that C.B. did not suffer from a loss of visual imagery or from impaired knowledge of the spatial attributes of objects. Therefore, C.B. did not seem to have an encompassing spatial disorder, but rather her problems were limited to more complex manipulation of visual information. Despite the good results on the spatial tests described above, her performance on drawing and constructional tasks continued to be contaminated in a rather particular manner-that is, by rotations, omissions, and misplacements of elements of the drawings. For example, she showed a tendency for left-right transpositions in drawing a clock face, placing the numbers 1-4 on the left and numbers 9 -11 on the right side of the clock. She made similar errors on a purely perceptual task, where she read the time off clock faces without numbers, using only the orientation of the hands as cues. Out of 12 clocks, she gave the correct time for only 3, and made three errors that were reflections across the vertical midline (e.g., saying "5 minutes to 2" in response to a clock depicting 9:55, or "20 past 7" in response to a clock depicting 7:40). Other errors were due to slight inaccuracies in judging the orientation of the hands (e.g., saying "8 o'clock" in response to a clock depicting 7:00). She made a small but consistent number of errors on a variety of mirror-image discrimination tasks on which she was asked to judge whether two shapes (line drawings of objects, abstract designs, or letters) were identical or mirror images of each other. She scored 36/40 with line drawings, 26/30 with abstract designs, and 15/20 with letters. In addition, she was at chance (19/40 correct) on a test requiring left-right judgments of pictures of hands and feet presented in different postures. These results suggest that C.B. suffered from some degree of left-right mirror-image confusion and, at first sight, they appear inconsistent with her very good left-right orientation in relation to her own body. However, as Corballis and Beale (1976) pointed out, General competence in using the labels "left" and "right" when referring to other objects, and discriminating left-right mirror images, requires more than just the ability to tell left from right; it requires knowledge of the conventions which specify how left and right must be mapped from our own bodies onto other bodies, objects, and places, and it requires the spatial ability to perform the mapping operations. (p. 20) C.B. appeared unable to carry out this mapping step. Because this mapping process is likely to involve rotating the reference frame of the object into congruence with the observer's reference frame, these findings also suggested a mental-rotation deficit. We, therefore, conducted three experiments to test C.B.'s mental-rotation skills.
Experiment 1
This experiment examined C.B.'s ability to perform a task that explicitly required mental rotation and investigated whether she would display the reaction time function that is considered the characteristic signature of mental rotation. We used a modified version of the classic manikin experiment (Ratcliff, 1979) , in which the subject has to decide whether a human figure is holding a disk in its left or right hand. The original task only uses upright and upside-down manikins, but in this experiment we presented the manikin at multiple orientations in the picture plane in order to obtain a reaction time function.
Method
Participants. C.B. and 4 healthy controls (3 women) matched for age (M ϭ 76 years, range ϭ 74 -80 years) participated in this experiment. The control subjects had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and were all community dwelling and active. Written consent was obtained before the experiments, and the protocol was approved by the local institutional ethics committee.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was conducted on a Macintosh Powerbook G3 computer with a 14-inch built-in monitor. The stimuli were created in Adobe Illustrator and were presented using the PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) , which also recorded responses. Two keys on the lower right-hand side of the keyboard were used for responding. The stimuli were single human figures somewhat similar to the manikins first used by Ratcliff (1979) . The figures could be facing toward or away from the observer and held a black disk in either the left or the right hand (for examples, see Figure 2 ). The frontand back-facing manikins had identical outlines and differed only in the details of the face. To avoid overfamiliarity with one figure, three manikin versions were created: one with its arms raised above its head, one with its arms spread out, and a third with its arms down. Thus, there were 12 possible manikins (3 arm postures ϫ 2 front-back views ϫ 2 hands holding the disk). The stimuli were rotated in 60°steps in the frontal plane, ranging from 0°to 300°. They were presented on a white background in central vision and subtended a visual angle of approximately 7°at the viewing distance of approximately 40 cm.
Procedure. The experiment was divided into six blocks of 12 items. Within each block, each of the 12 manikin versions appeared in one of the six orientations, in random order, with an equal number of left and right correct responses. Thus, across the six blocks, each stimulus appeared in all orientations.
Before the start of the experiment, the subjects received both written and oral instructions and were given a block of six selfpaced practice items randomly selected from the total pool. In the actual experiment, the stimuli were presented with an interstimulus interval of 500 ms, and they remained on the screen until the participant responded or for a maximum of 5 s. The subjects decided as quickly as possible whether the manikin was holding the disk in the left or right hand and responded by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard (labeled "L" and "R" with stick-on labels) with the index or middle finger of the right hand. The stimulus delivery during each experimental block was controlled by the computer and could not be interrupted, but subjects were allowed rest breaks between blocks.
Results and Discussion
Reaction time. The computer only recorded responses given within the 5-s time limit. Incorrect trials and trials in which RT was less than 500 ms and that followed a missed trial were excluded from the analysis. RTs were averaged for each subject and each orientation, and the data are presented in Figure 3 . Note that the results plotted for 0°and 360°reflect the same data and are displayed in this way only to assist the reader in judging the degree of symmetry around 180°; however, the analyses only considered the 0°d ata once.
As can be seen, the control subjects showed the expected mental-rotation function, in which RT increased with the angle of rotation, for both front views and back views of manikins. There was a difference between the front-facing manikins, which generally engendered longer RTs, and the back-facing manikins, which resulted in faster RTs for all angles except 180°(see Figure 3 ). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with View (front vs. back) and Orientation as within-subject factors conducted on the control subjects' data revealed a marginally significant effect of View, F(1, 3) ϭ 7.92, p ϭ .07, and a significant interaction between View and Orientation, F(5, 15) ϭ 3.79, p Ͻ .05. These findings are consistent with observations reported by Zacks et al. (1999) , that interpreting the left and right sides of a front-facing, as a opposed to a back-facing, human figure involves an additional transformation.
A contrast with weights Ϫ3, Ϫ1, 1, 3, 1, Ϫ1 for data at 0°, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°, respectively, was used to test for a linear trend in RT across orientation angle for each subject separately. For back-facing manikins, a significant linear trend was found in each case, F(1, 25) ϭ 14.12, p Ͻ .01; F(1, 30) ϭ 23.01, p Ͻ .01; F(1, 28) ϭ 22.54, p Ͻ .01; F(1, 28) ϭ 21.67, p Ͻ .01 (the different degrees of freedom reflect differences in the number of correct trials completed by each subject). For front-facing manikins, 3 out of the 4 control subjects showed a significant linear trend in RT across orientation angle, F(1, 22) ϭ 4.61, p Ͻ .05; F(1, 27) ϭ 15.89, p Ͻ .01; F(1, 28) ϭ 5.03, p Ͻ .05; the 4th control subject did not show this linear trend in RT (F Ͻ 1), mainly because of very slow responses to the upright stimuli.
In contrast to the control subjects, C.B. did not show the expected linear increase in RT across orientation angles, F(1, 11) ϭ 1.59, F(1, 14) ϭ 0.51, for back-facing and front-facing manikins, respectively ( ps Ͼ .05; see Figure 3 ).
Accuracy. Although the main measure of interest in this experiment was RT, we also looked at the accuracy of responses given by C.B. and the control subjects to check whether the pattern of RT results was due to a speedaccuracy trade-off. Only responses given within the 5-s time limit were counted. The control subjects performed accurately with both front and back views of the manikins (accuracy rates higher than 90% for all orientations), and there was no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off (Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient r s ϭ Ϫ.54, ns). If anything, they tended to be less accurate at orientations at which they were also slower, a pattern that has been demonstrated repeatedly in previous mental-rotation studies (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1985; McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1990; Shepard & Cooper, 1982) . In contrast, C.B. made many errors on this task. For front views of the manikins, her accuracy rates were 0°ϭ 60%, 60°ϭ 67%, 120°ϭ 20%, 180°ϭ 100%, 240°ϭ 60%, and 300°ϭ 67%. For back views of the manikins, her accuracy rates were 0°ϭ 33%, 60°ϭ 67%, 120°ϭ 80%, 180°ϭ 50%, 240°ϭ 60%, and 300°ϭ 50%. In addition to poor accuracy, she also demonstrated a strong positive relationship between RT and accuracy (Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient r s ϭ .99, p Ͻ .01), with more accurate scores corresponding to longer RTs. Thus, the RT and accuracy results both indicate that C.B.'s behavior during this experiment was different from that of the control participants and suggest that she was not capable of performing mental rotation.
A somewhat surprising finding of this experiment was that C.B.'s accuracy was poor even with upright back views of the manikins, because these stimuli should not require mental rotation or other transformation of the manikin's coordinates to her egocentric reference frame. This could imply that C.B. was simply unable to tell left from right. However, from the clinical investigations, we know that she had good left-right orientation in personal space, although she appeared to have difficulty mapping her own left and right to the reference frame of an external object. This mapping operation would be particularly taxing in the present experiment because front and back views of the manikin were randomly intermixed throughout the experiment and represented constant switches of the relative locations of the left and right hands. We suspect that this fact could account for C.B.'s poor accuracy across all conditions of this experiment, because she may have adopted a strategy of attempting mental transformations on every trial, even when these were unnecessary. Indeed, when she was given a paper-and-pencil version of the task, she showed a clear difference between her performance with back views (7/8 correct) versus front views (3/8 correct) of the manikins, just as would be expected if the front views required an additional mental transformation (e.g., Zacks et al., 1999) . The next experiment was designed to get around this potentially confusing factor by using stimuli viewed from a single position, such that the left and right of the upright stimulus always corresponded to C.B.'s own left and right sides.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, C.B. was shown pictures of objects presented in different orientations in the picture plane. Each object had a dot positioned next to it, and C.B. had to judge whether the dot was to the left or right of the object. Two control conditions were included: In one, the dot was near the top or the bottom of the object; in the other, the dot was located near the front or back of the object (see Figure 4) . Previous research has shown that mental rotation is required for left-right judgments about rotated objects but not for top-bottom or front-back judgments (Corballis & Cullen, 1986) . This is because the latter judgments could be made on the basis of semantic and structural knowledge about the . Examples of stimuli used in the three conditions of Experiment 2. In the first condition, subjects decided whether the dot was located near the top or the bottom of the pictured object; in the second condition, they decided whether the dot was to the left or to the right of the pictured object; in the third condition, they decided whether the dot was in front of or behind the object.
objects (e.g., knowing that a dog has a tail at the back), whereas the left-right judgment requires that the object be aligned with the reference frame of the observer (Corballis & Cullen, 1986) . Therefore, we hypothesized that C.B. would only find the left-right judgments difficult and, in particular, that her deficit would be confined to situations when the objects were rotated away from the upright.
Method
Participants. The same individuals who took part in Experiment 1 also participated in this experiment.
Stimuli. The stimuli were delivered and the responses were recorded in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The stimuli were chosen from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set and were presented on a white background in central vision. They subtended a visual angle of approximately 7°at a viewing distance of approximately 40 cm. Two slightly different groups of eight stimuli were used for different conditions of the experiment: For the left-right and top-bottom conditions, they were car, cat, dress, dresser, jug, mouse, sailing boat, and stool; for the front-back condition, they were bear, bicycle, car, cat, chair, kangaroo, mouse, and sailing boat. The latter set consisted mainly of side views of animals and vehicles to ensure that the stimuli had an obvious "front" and "back." Half these stimuli faced left, and half faced right. Each stimulus was displayed with a dot near the top or the bottom of the stimulus (in the top-bottom condition) or to the left or right of the stimulus (in the left-right and front-back conditions). Stimuli were either upright, rotated by 90°, or rotated by 180°(see Figure 4 for examples) .
Procedure. The experiment comprised three conditions, topbottom, left-right, and front-back, administered in three separate blocks in this order. In the top-bottom condition, the task was to decide whether the dot was displayed near the top or the bottom of the pictured object, regardless of the object's orientation. Participants responded by pressing one of two keys on the computer keyboard, labeled "T" and "B" with stick-on labels. In the leftright condition, the task was to decide whether the dot was to the left or the right of the pictured object, again disregarding the object's orientation. To avoid any confusion, subjects were specifically instructed to decide whether the dot would have been to the left or the right of the picture had the picture been upright.
Subjects gave their responses using the same keys as in the previous condition, which were now labeled "L" and "R." In the front-back condition, the task was to decide whether the dot was "in front of" or "behind" the pictured object, and the same keys (now labeled "F" and "B") were used for responding. Note that although the left-right and front-back conditions require different responses, they are identical in terms of the physical location of the dot relative to the stimulus.
Within each experimental condition, the eight pictures were presented six times, as a factorial combination of three orientations (0°, 90°, 180°) and two dot positions (i.e., top or bottom, left or right, front or back, depending on the condition). Half the items at 90°were rotated clockwise, and half were rotated counterclockwise, and the results for these two orientations were combined. Thus, there were 48 items in each condition, 16 at each of the 0°, 90°, and 180°orientations. Before each experimental condition, subjects received written and oral instructions relevant to the current condition and completed a six-item practice block using different stimuli. Each experimental block began with a 500-ms fixation cross in the middle of the screen, followed by the first stimulus. The stimulus remained on the screen until the subject responded, or for a maximum of 4 s, and was followed by another 500-ms fixation cross and then the subsequent stimulus.
Results and Discussion
In this experiment, we did not analyze the RT data because C.B. failed to respond within the 4-s time limit on a large number of trials in the left-right condition, and RTs were not recorded for these trials. The remaining RTs, therefore, were not considered to be an accurate representation of her performance. Thus, the only variable of interest in this experiment was accuracy. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the control participants performed very well, regardless of condition and orientation (mean correct performance Ͼ 95% in all conditions).
C.B. also performed well in the top-bottom condition. Her accuracy was above 94% for all orientations, with no apparent effect of orientation, 2 (2, N ϭ 48) ϭ 1.98, ns. Similarly, there was no effect of orientation in the frontback condition, 2 (2, N ϭ 48) ϭ 2.26, ns. Although her accuracy with rotated items in this condition was somewhat lower than in the top-bottom condition, inspection of the data revealed that this was due to the fact that C.B. systematically misinterpreted the front versus the back of a single item (the sailing boat) but did not make errors with any other stimuli. Therefore, we conclude that she had no general difficulty in making front-back judgments. In contrast, C.B.'s accuracy in the left-right condition was significantly affected by the orientation of the item, 2 (2, N ϭ 48) ϭ 31.96, p Ͻ .01. She was accurate when the items were upright (93% correct) or rotated by 90°(100% correct), but she systematically gave the wrong answer in the case of upside-down stimuli (0% correct). Furthermore, it should be noted that, despite her accurate performance with stimuli rotated by 90°, she failed to respond within the 4-s time limit on 7/16 of these items. This suggests that C.B. also had considerable difficulty processing the items rotated by 90°, although she could arrive at the correct answer if given enough time. A possible explanation for this more accurate performance with stimuli rotated by 90°is that C.B. may have tilted her head to look at these stimuli and thus could answer correctly (albeit slowly) without the need for "mental" rotation. Alternatively, she may have had some residual ability to perform mental rotation across shorter angular distances.
In summary, the control participants were very accurate in all conditions, whereas C.B. performed well in the topbottom and front-back conditions but had great difficulty in the left-right condition when the items were rotated away from the upright. Her good performance with upright items, and indeed her systematic reversals when the items were upside down, confirmed that she did not suffer from leftright confusion per se. Instead, as hypothesized, her problem seemed to be one of mapping her egocentric left and right to the left and right sides of an object when the two reference frames were not aligned. Therefore, these results are consistent with an impairment in mental rotation.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, C.B. demonstrated a profound inability to judge whether a dot was placed to the left or to the right of a rotated object. In particular, when the items were inverted, she systematically gave the wrong answer, which suggests that in this case she did not even attempt to solve the task within the reference frame of the object but rather gave responses on the basis of whether the dot was to her own left or right. This raises the possibility that she may have misunderstood what was required of her and assumed that the left-right judgment should be made in relation to her egocentric frame of reference. Experiment 3 was designed to eliminate such potential confusion by forcing C.B. to operate solely within the reference frame of the objects. In this experiment, she was shown two identical objects that were rotated by varying degrees relative to one another. A dot was located to the left or right of each object, and C.B. had to decide whether the dots were on the same side of the objects or on different sides.
After running this experiment, we became aware that the degree of symmetry of the stimuli could play an important role in the subjects' performance. For example, out of the stimulus pool used, some of the stimuli had informative features distinguishing the left and right sides, whereas others lacked features that readily distinguished the left and right sides of the picture. We wondered whether C.B. would have less difficulty with the first type of items because, in this case, she could rely on distinguishing features to make her judgments, in a manner analogous to the front-back decision in Experiment 2. In contrast, more symmetric items presumably require mental rotation to bring the two objects into congruence before a decision can be made. Therefore, for the analysis of this experiment, the stimuli were divided into two groups according to whether they had features that readily distinguished their left and right sides.
Method
Participants. These were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. Stimuli. The stimuli were delivered and responses recorded in the same manner as Experiment 1. For this experiment, we used 12 line drawings from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set. Five of them (basket, chair, lamp, penguin, tree) did not have features that readily distinguished the left and right sides; we call these items "symmetric," even though strictly speaking they are not completely symmetric shapes. The other seven pictures (bicycle, camel, dog, duck, elephant, frying pan, kettle) were asymmetric side views of animals or objects with rather different left and right sides. Each stimulus had a dot printed next to it, either on the left or the right side, and together they subtended a visual angle of approximately 7°at the viewing distance of approximately 40 cm.
Procedure. In each trial, pairs of identical objects (e.g., two kettles) were presented side by side, separated by approximately 2 cm. The two stimuli could have the dots printed either in the same position relative to the object (i.e., each object had a dot on its left side or on its right side) or in different relative positions (i.e., a dot to the left of one object and a dot to the right of the other object). Note that for the asymmetric items, this means that the dot was either next to a distinguishing feature (e.g., the kettle's spout) or on the opposite side of the item. For each pair, the orientation of the two objects was manipulated so that they were rotated by 0°, 90°, or 180°relative to each other. There were four rotation conditions. In Condition 1, the objects did not differ in orientation and were both either upright or upside down. In Condition 2, the objects were rotated by 90°relative to each other, one object being upright or upside down and the other one being rotated by 90°clockwise or counterclockwise; the combinations covered the four quadrants equally often. In Condition 3, the objects differed by 180°in the vertical dimension (i.e., one object was upright and the other was upside down). In Condition 4, the objects were also rotated by 180°relative to each other but this time in the horizontal dimension (i.e., one object was rotated by 90°clockwise and the other by 90°counterclockwise).
The experiment was divided into four blocks of 24 trials. Within each block, the 12 object pairs were divided into four groups, and each group was presented in one of the four rotation conditions, once with the dot in the same relative position and once with the dot in different relative positions. The assignment of items to conditions was varied from block to block such that, across the four blocks, each of the 12 object pairs appeared in all four rotation conditions. The order of the stimuli in each block was randomized. Before the experiment, the subjects completed 10 practice trials, using different pictures from the ones used in the actual experiment. The experiment began with a central fixation cross for 1 s, followed by the first trial. The stimuli remained on the screen until the subject responded, at which point they were replaced with the fixation cross for 1 s and then followed by the next stimulus. The subjects decided as quickly as possible whether the dots were in the same or different positions relative to the objects, regardless of the objects' orientation. They responded by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard, labeled "S" and "D."
Results and Discussion Figure 6 shows performance accuracy and RT for the control group and C.B., plotted separately for symmetric and asymmetric items. Preliminary inspection of the data revealed that in Condition 1, all subjects performed rather differently when both stimuli were upright compared with when both stimuli were upside down. This difference was reflected in the RT of the control subjects and in C.B.'s accuracy. Therefore, the data for these items were plotted and analyzed separately.
Accuracy. As shown in the top panel of Figure 6 , the control group performed well in all rotation conditions, with both symmetric and asymmetric items. The lowest mean performance (90% correct) was for symmetric items when they were rotated by 180°relative to each other in the vertical dimension. C.B. was generally less accurate than the control participants in the rotated conditions of this experiment (Ͼ 2 SD away from their mean score). This general decrease in performance could be attributed to the increased attentional demands of having to process two stimuli, as also suggested by the fact that she was considerably slower than the control participants across the board (see Figure 6 , bottom panel). The important finding is that C.B. showed a marked dissociation between her accuracy with symmetric and asymmetric items, 2 (1, N ϭ 96) ϭ 4.76, p Ͻ .05. In general, she performed quite well with the asymmetric items (100% correct in Condition 1 and Ͼ 78% correct in the other conditions), as might be expected if she made use of salient features to judge the location of the dot relative to the object. In the case of symmetric stimuli, however, her performance was clearly influenced by the orientation of the stimulus. She scored 100% correct when both items were upright. She performed quite well when the items were rotated by 90°relative to each other (82% correct), but she was at chance (50% correct) when the stimuli were rotated by 180°relative to each other, in either vertical or horizontal dimensions. Surprisingly, she also performed extremely poorly when both symmetric items were upside down (38% correct), even though this condition should not require mental rotation given that the stimuli are in identical orientations (but see below).
Reaction times. Our contention that symmetric items would require mental rotation is supported by the fact that the control subjects took longer to respond to the rotated symmetric items than the rotated asymmetric items (see Figure 6 , bottom panel; only RTs for correct responses are shown). The RTs of the normal controls were subjected to an ANOVA with symmetry of stimulus and rotation condition as within-subject variables. There was a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 3) ϭ 14.14, p Ͻ .05, and of condition, F(4, 12) ϭ 3.64, p Ͻ .05, but no significant interaction between these factors (F Ͻ 1). However, it is clear from the figure that the difference between symmetric and asymmetric stimuli was only present for rotated items and was not present when both items were upright. C.B. showed a similar tendency to respond more slowly to rotated symmetric items than to rotated asymmetric items, consistent with her poorer accuracy with symmetric items.
Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that C.B. had significant difficulties carrying out mental rotation. As in Experiment 2, she performed better when she had to Figure 6 . Mean percent correct responses (top panel) and reaction times (bottom panel) produced by C.B. and the control group in Experiment 3, plotted separately for symmetric and asymmetric stimuli. In Condition 1, the objects did not differ in orientationthey were either both upright (0°U) or both upside down (0°D); in Condition 2 (90°) the objects were rotated by 90°relative to each other; in Condition 3 (180°V) the objects were rotated by 180°relative to each other in the vertical dimension; in Condition 4 (180°H), the objects were rotated by 180°relative to each other in the horizontal dimension. U ϭ upright; D ϭ upside down; V ϭ vertical; H ϭ horizontal.
compare objects that required a 90°rotation than objects that required a 180°rotation. However, in the present experiment, C.B. was also accurate when comparing a stimulus rotated by 90°with a stimulus rotated by 180°. This could not have been achieved by simply tilting her head to avoid doing mental rotation, and therefore, the pattern of results obtained in the two experiments argues more in favor of some residual ability to do mental rotation over smaller angular distances.
Interestingly, the present results also suggest that mental rotation is required when comparing two symmetric upsidedown stimuli, even though in this case the stimuli do not differ in orientation. First, the control participants took a considerably longer time to respond when both stimuli were upside down than when both stimuli were upright (3,855 ms vs. 2,543 ms, on average). Second, C.B. showed a marked difference in her response accuracy when the two stimuli were upright (100% correct) compared with when both stimuli were upside down (38% correct). This is consistent with the idea that trials involving two upside-down stimuli require mental rotation and that C.B. could not perform this step. Finally, C.B.'s relatively accurate performance with asymmetric items indicates that she had no difficulty understanding what was required of her in this task. Therefore, we can be more confident that her poor results with symmetric items reflect a mental-rotation deficit rather than a failure to comprehend the task.
General Discussion
The present experiments have identified a profound deficit in mental rotation in a patient who suffered an infarction in the right corpus striatum (i.e., caudate nucleus, putamen, and globus pallidus). In Experiment 1, C.B. was unable to judge the left and right sides of a manikin accurately, and she did not show the systematic increase in RTs with increasing rotation of the stimulus from the upright that is the characteristic time signature of mental rotation. She also showed a strong speed-accuracy trade-off in this experiment, unlike the error patterns displayed by the control subjects and by other normal people on mental-rotation tasks (Jolicoeur, 1985; McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1990; Shepard & Cooper, 1982) .
In Experiment 2, C.B. was selectively impaired when required to make left-right, but not top-bottom or frontback, decisions about rotated objects. Critically, her accuracy in making top-bottom and front-back decisions demonstrates that she did not have a general problem in spatial localization. Furthermore, the front-back condition of this experiment provides a very powerful control, being identical to the left-right condition in terms of the physical location of the dot but requiring a different response. Previous research has shown that left-right judgments about rotated objects reliably induce mental rotation in normal people (Corballis & Cullen, 1986; Corballis & McMaster, 1996; Jolicoeur, 1985; McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1990) , whereas top-bottom and front-back judgments do not (Corballis & Cullen, 1986; Jolicoeur, Ingleton, Bartram, & Booth, 1993) . This is presumably because top-bottom and front-back decisions can be made on the basis of knowledge about the salient features of objects (e.g., a car has wheels at the bottom, and a dog has a tail at the back), whereas a left-right decision can only be made by mapping the observer's left and right onto the reference frame of the object.
C.B. was also profoundly impaired when she had to compare two symmetric objects rotated relative to each other in Experiment 3. Because these stimuli do not have features that readily distinguish their left and right sides, we argue that this task requires mental rotation in order to align the two objects before making the comparison (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) . This contention was supported by the RTs of the control subjects. On this task, C.B.'s accuracy deteriorated with increasing angular differences between objects, just as would be expected if greater angular disparities required more mental rotation. Again, it is important to note that she was better able to solve the task when both items were in identical upright orientations (thus not requiring mental rotation) and when the judgment could be made on the basis of distinctive features, thus ruling out a more basic deficit in spatial localization or in the ability to compare two objects. An unexpected finding of this experiment was that C.B. was also severely impaired when the two symmetric objects were in identical upside-down orientations (a condition that we did not expect would require mental rotation). We interpreted this finding to mean that subjects mentally rotate both items to the upright before making a comparison. This interpretation was supported by the fact that all subjects responded considerably faster when both objects were upright, whereas their RTs were comparable to those of the other rotated conditions when both objects were upside down.
Taken together with other clinical findings, such as her left-right transposition errors in drawing and reading clock faces, these results indicate that C.B. was unable to map the reference frame of an external object to her egocentric reference frame and that this failure was due to an inability to carry out mental rotation.
A Possible Role for the Basal Ganglia in Mental Rotation
This study suggests that mental-rotation impairments can arise from damage to the right corpus striatum. Although we cannot rule out an involvement of the white matter projections to cortical areas in the frontal and parietal lobes, or possible neuronal loss outside the lesion visualized on the scans, the visible structural damage identified by CT 5 weeks after the stroke occurred was restricted to the corpus striatum and especially the caudate nucleus. On the available evidence, the most compelling account of C.B.'s deficits is in terms of this basal ganglia lesion.
There are good a priori reasons for postulating a role for the basal ganglia in mental rotation. First, the striatum (the caudate nucleus and the putamen) receives extensive projections from the parietal lobe (Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Selemon & Goldman-Rakic, 1988; Yeterian & Pandya, 1993) , which is the region most consistently linked to mental-rotation performance (Alivisatos & Petrides, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Ditunno & Mann, 1990; Harris et al., 2000; Kosslyn et al., 1998; Passini et al., 2000; Tagaris et al., 1996) . Second, the basal ganglia have strong connections to the motor cortex, another area that has recently been implicated in mental rotation (Ganis et al., 2000; Georgopoulos & Pellizzer, 1995; Kosslyn et al., 1998; Richter et al., 2000; Tagaris et al., 1997) . Thus, the basal ganglia are ideally placed to integrate information pertaining to both the visuospatial and motor aspects of the mental-rotation process. Third, disorders of the basal ganglia, such as Parkinson's disease and Huntington's disease, are often associated with visuospatial deficits (Brown & Marsden, 1987; Lawrence, Watkins, Sahakian, Hodges, & Robbins, 2000; Lee et al., 1998; Mohr et al., 1991) . Finally, a recent positron emission tomography experiment found activation in the right caudate nucleus during mental rotation of alphanumeric characters (Alivisatos & Petrides, 1997) .
To date, there is only limited evidence about which specific brain areas are critical to mental rotation. Functional imaging studies generally cannot distinguish between areas that are necessary for successful performance and areas that are recruited by the mental-rotation process without playing a critical role in it. These studies need to be supplemented by lesion or temporary inactivation (e.g., TMS) studies that demonstrate that damage to, or disruption of, certain brain regions leads to an inability to perform mental rotation. Impairments in mental rotation have often been associated with rather large lesions (e.g., right posterior hemisphere, left posterior hemisphere), and therefore, such investigations are not very helpful for anatomical localization. However, a small number of studies have shown that mental-rotation deficits can result from smaller lesions confined to the right parietal lobe (Ditunno & Mann, 1990; Passini et al., 2000) , and a recent report indicates that magnetic stimulation of the left primary motor cortex can disrupt mental rotation (Ganis et al., 2000) . Therefore, we can conclude that these areas constitute critical nodes in a mental-rotation network. The present study provides evidence that the right corpus striatum may be another component in that network.
It remains to be determined exactly how these structures interact during mental rotation. On the basis of the available evidence, we could speculate that the right parietal cortex computes the spatial transformations that map the imagined rotation (see Harris et al., 2000) . These transformation parameters are then passed on to motor centers that elaborate movement signals consistent with these visuomotor transformations (Georgopoulos et al., 1989; Georgopoulos & Pellizzer, 1995; Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 2000) . Feedback from the motor cortex could, in turn, provide the movement signals that enable the parietal cortex to update the internal representation of the stimulus as it passes through intermediate orientations between the starting position and the end point (Colby, 1999) . The striatum is well placed to act as the interface between these two mechanisms and may serve to select and maintain an appropriate motor program for performing smooth and accurate rotation, given the transformation parameters dictated by the parietal lobe.
This description is consistent with some current conceptual models of striatal function that suggest a prominent role for these structures in context-dependent action selection (Lawrence, Sahakian, & Robbins, 1998) .
The fact that C.B. did not appear to have a visual imagery deficit is consistent with an explanation of her mentalrotation deficit in terms of an impairment in the on-line processing and maintenance of the appropriate image transformations rather than impaired access to visual representations. In addition, there is some suggestion from Experiments 2 and 3 that C.B. had some ability to perform mental rotation over short angular distances of up to 90°but was unable to carry out mental rotations over the greater angular distance of 180°. A possible explanation for C.B.'s inability to perform the appropriate mental transformations for larger rotations is an impairment in on-line error detection and correction. A recent study has attributed a role for the striatum in such on-line error correction of movements (Smith, Brandt, & Shadmehr, 2000) . This study showed that patients with Huntington's disease, although able to initiate movements correctly, displayed increasing jerkiness during the latter part of a movement and showed an inability to compensate for external perturbations during the movement. C.B.'s pattern of performance would be consistent with a failure to implement the appropriate corrections across the course of longer imagined rotations. If that were true, these findings would provide support for the notion that the basal ganglia constitute a more general error correction mechanism that is not only restricted to movements but also encompasses cognitive and emotional processing (Lawrence, 2000) . Further studies of patients with basal ganglia lesions and mental-rotation impairments are needed to investigate whether this hypothesis is correct.
Recognition of Misoriented Objects Does Not Require Mental Rotation
The results of the present study also have important implications for theories of object recognition. One of the long-standing debates on object recognition concerns whether or not recognition of rotated objects is accomplished through mental rotation. Jolicoeur (1985) has been the main proponent of the positive side of the argument, which is based on the fact that naming latencies for rotated objects display a mental-rotation-like function, with approximately linear increases between 0°and 120°(see also Tarr & Pinker, 1989) . However, this naming function differs in some fundamental ways from the classic mental-rotation RT function. First, it is considerably flatter, implying much faster "rotation rates." Second, it is characterized by a dip at 180°, in sharp contrast with mental-rotation functions elicited by mirror discrimination or left-right judgments, which typically show a pronounced peak at this orientation. Third, the effect of misorientation on naming disappears with practice, whereas it remains largely unchanged for left-right or mirror-image discriminations (Jolicoeur, 1985) . In addition, as Corballis (1988) has pointed out, there is a logical difficulty in supposing that mental rotation is needed for object recognition: If one does not know what the object is, how can one know how to rotate it to its canonical upright?
More recently, evidence obtained from both cognitive studies (Jolicoeur, Corballis, & Lawson, 1998) and physiological experiments with monkeys (Perrett, Oram, & Ashbridge, 1998) has explicitly challenged the notion that recognition of rotated objects requires mental rotation. The monkey experiments in particular provide a good explanation for the orientation effects on naming speed without the need to postulate mental rotation. These studies showed that the speed with which an object is recognized depends on the accumulation of activity among neurons in the inferior temporal lobe that are selective for the object. For any familiar object, more cells are tuned to the most frequently experienced view (e.g., upright), leading to faster recognition than that of unusual views or orientations. This accounts for the increased time to recognize rotated views and also explains why the orientation effects on recognition diminish with training.
A more direct refutation of the relationship between object recognition and mental rotation comes from neuropsychological studies. Farah and Hammond (1988) described a patient who was apparently able to recognize misoriented objects but at the same time was unable to carry out mental rotation. The opposite pattern was reported by Turnbull and McCarthy (1996) , thus providing a classic double dissociation of these two processes. However, although Farah and Hammond's case has often been cited as support for a dissociation between mental rotation and orientation invariance in recognition, their data are somewhat inconclusive. First, they only tested recognition of upright and upside-down line drawings of objects, and their subject's naming of upside-down items was never intact (78% correct on initial testing, 72% correct 7 months later). Second, his recognition of upright drawings was equally impaired on initial testing (78% correct). The results obtained with C.B. are much more compelling in this regard: Although she was unable to perform mental rotation, she was very accurate (95% correct) in identifying objects and silhouettes rotated by 90°and 180°in the picture plane. Therefore, C.B.'s results argue for the independence of object recognition and mental rotation.
In conclusion, the findings of this study provide evidence for an important role for the right corpus striatum in mental rotation. We suggest that the role of these structures is to select and maintain an appropriate motor program for performing smooth and accurate rotation that is based on spatial mapping information provided by the parietal lobe. The present results also have important implications for theories of object recognition, by demonstrating that recognition of objects rotated in the picture plane can be achieved without mental rotation.
